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M A H E N D R A L AW OT I

Nepal and Bhutan in 2009
Transition Travails?
A B S T R AC T

Democratic transitions in Nepal and Bhutan ran into challenges in 2009. The integration of Maoist combatants, polarization among political parties, increasing ethnic
assertion, and mushrooming armed groups have delayed constitution writing in Nepal
and led to political instability. In Bhutan, societal assertion against limited rights and
discrimination is increasing.
K E Y W O R D S : Nepal, Bhutan, Democratic Transition, Maoists, constitution-making

N E PA L

In contrast to the more optimistic scenario in 2008, Nepal’s peace process
and transition to democracy increasingly appeared to be running into rough
weather by late 2009. In particular, the political confrontation between the
Maoists and other political parties delayed writing of the new Constitution.
The year 2009 had actually begun with the Communist Party of NepalMaoist (CPN-M) at the helm of the state, with Pushpa Kamal Dahal (a.k.a.
Prachanda) as prime minister of a coalition government that included most
major political players in the country except the Nepali Congress Party.1 This
was a rosy political situation that many had not imagined even a year ago,
before the Constituent Assembly (CA) election. The performance of the
short-lived Maoist government, however, was mixed. The Maoists did not
attempt to impose some of the radical policies they had espoused during their
decade-long insurgency, such as land redistribution and socialist economics
Mahendra Lawoti is Associate Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University in
Kalamazoo, Michigan, U.S.A., and President of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies.
Email: <mahendra.lawoti@wmich.edu>.
1. CPN-M and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unity Center (Masal) merged on January 13,
2009, to become the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).
Asian Survey, Vol. 50, Number 1, pp. 164–172. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2010
by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights
and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2010.50.1.164.
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including nationalization. This was largely because of the constraints imposed
by coalition politics. Rather, they worked more or less within the framework
of a market economy that seemed to please the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The finance minister, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, was
successful in reaching a very ambitious revenue collection target of 141 billion
Nepali rupees (approximately $1.88 billion) but then failed to spend the generated revenue in planned development activities.
The army integration issue remained a primary sticking point in deepening
the “peace process.” It may continue to be a problem into 2010 unless some
sort of mechanism is developed to guarantee a sense of security and political
space for both the Maoists and other important political actors.2 The Maoists
fear that, without their army, the state agencies and other political parties
might eventually attempt to undermine them. In contrast, the non-Maoist
political parties fear that the Maoists may eventually use their armed cadres
to try to forcibly capture the state. The Maoists remain suspicious and cautious because of the previous alignment against them of the Nepalese army,
other major political parties, and the media, bureaucracy, and judiciary during the insurgency. Conversely, the Maoists’ intolerance toward the opposition, refusal to renounce violence, and periodic advocacy of a communist
state have made the non-Maoists nervous about their true intentions.3
The Nepalese army and the Maoists have interpreted differently the ambiguous wording of the 2006 CPA and other documents, in terms of the
exact modalities for integration of the army.4 While the Maoists want to integrate their armed cadres collectively in the national army, the army resists
this approach. In contrast, the Nepalese army prefers that the Maoist cadres
be provided with civilian work opportunities, or, alternatively, be accommodated into the civilian security forces such as the various police services.
2. Nepal, in reality, had two “armies” at the time of peace settlement: the official Nepalese army
of the state and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the Maoists. Viable and functioning states
have only one army. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of November 2006 called for “the
rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants,” and the December 2007 Agreement on Monitoring of
Management of Arms and Armies referred to “integration” of the Maoist combatants “into the security
forces.”
3. See World People’s Resistance Movement, “Nepal: Interview with Comrade Baburam Bhattarai,” October 2009, at <http://networkedblogs.com/p15796817>, accessed on November 1, 2009.
For a discussion of various aspects of the insurgency, also see Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari,
eds., The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-first Century (London: Routledge, 2009).
4. International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process,” Asia Report, no. 163, February
19, 2009.
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Political parties like the Nepali Congress and Madhesi (Plainsmen) People’s
Right Forum (MPRF), and external powers such as India and the U.S., have
also increasingly opposed collective integration of the Maoist fighters into
the Nepalese army.5 Relations between the army and the Maoists deteriorated over the issue of the army’s recruitment drive in 2007 and 2008, and
soured further in 2009.6 Nepal’s defense minister, Ram Bahadur Thapa
(a.k.a. Badal)—a former Maoist—refused to extend the appointments of
eight brigadier generals in March. Even though the Supreme Court eventually reinstated the generals, the damage was done. The Nepalese army reacted
by boycotting the fifth national games—a major countrywide sports and
athletics meet—in April because the Maoists were allowed to take part. This,
in turn, infuriated the Maoists, who viewed it as being a challenge to the
Maoist-led government’s authority.
In May, the Maoists attempted to remove the soon-to-retire army chief,
Rookmangud Katawal, who was leading the anti-Maoist campaign. They
appointed his second-in-command, Lt. General Kul Bahadur Khadka, who
was going to retire sooner than the General Katawal. The army chief ’s removal raised suspicions in non-Maoist political quarters that the Maoists
had brokered a deal with General Khadka by which he would act in their
favor in return for promotion. Eighteen political parties represented in the
CA subsequently urged President Ram Baran Yadav, a Nepali Congress nominee close to its party president Girija Prasad Koirala, to nullify the Maoists’
5. The MPRF represents the Madhesis who, along with the indigenous nationalities and Dalits,
are increasingly challenging the historic domination of the state and polity by the higher caste, hill
Hindu elites. The latter include the Bahun and Chhetri (hill Brahmins and Kshatriyas, respectively)
who collectively comprise about 31% of the population. The Madhesis, residents of the Tarai (lowlands) and southern plains, share common languages and culture with various north Indian communities. For this reason, the indigenous nationalities of the hills and Dalits suspect their loyalty to
the country. The indigenous nationalities, comprising more than 60 groups and collectively around
37% of the population, base their claims as being the “first residents” of various parts of the country.
The Dalits, who comprise around 15% of the population, are struggling against exclusion in the state
and injustice perpetuated by both hill and upper caste Hindu Madhesi groups. Overlap of identities, such as that of Dalits from the Tarai, complicates the neat categorizations of the various “ethnic
groups” and also often results in discrimination against various subgroups within “ethnicities.” For
instance, the Madhesi population can be calculated as being more than 30% if Dalits, indigenous
nationalities, and Muslims of the Tarai are also included.
6. The Nepalese army took raw recruits into its ranks in 2007, despite Maoist objections. This
caused controversy as the relationship between the Maoist-led government and the Nepalese army
deteriorated through 2008, resulting in the Maoist fighters also threatening to recruit new members
into their ranks.

AS5001_15_Nepal&Bhutan-Lawoti.indd 166

2/12/10 2:04 PM

L AW OT I / N E PA L and B H U TA N I N 2 0 0 9 • 1 6 7

move. Yadav urged General Katawal to continue as army chief, arguing that
the Maoists had improperly removed him by not going through the president’s office. However, the Yadav’s critics responded by pointing out that he
lacked the power to nullify decisions taken by the Cabinet. In a move that
surprised many, Prachanda resigned as prime minister the following day, citing violation of civilian supremacy by the ceremonial president, who did not
abide by the Cabinet decision.
Power Transition

Madhav Kumar Nepal of the CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist) was elected prime minister by the CA on May 23,
2009. Twenty-two parties—including the Nepali Congress, a faction of the
MPRF, and other smaller parties—formed a coalition to back him. The
Maoists did not file a nominee for prime minister because they could not
muster a majority support in the CA. Nepal’s personal characteristics, such
as his reputation for being willing to compromise and build consensus, are
probably suitable for a transition period, but he and his Cabinet remained
dogged by questions of legitimacy. For example, he had lost elections from
two constituencies in 2008, and many prominent members of his new Cabinet either did not compete in those elections or had lost themselves.7
The formation of a second government within nine months showed that
old habits die hard even in the “new Nepal.” Power aggrandizement resulted
in the short tenure of the previous government; it threatens the new one as
well. Likewise, political parties such as the MPRF split during the formation
of the new government. Party splits not only weaken the party system but
also potentially contribute in short tenure of governments by facilitating
short-term political deals for mutual advantage. Nepotism also seems to be
continuing, sometimes more brazenly today than in the past. Family members of powerful politicians have been nominated to the CA from the proportional representation quota. Prachanda and Baburam appointed close
7. An election for the CA was held in April 2008 in order to bring the Maoists into the national
political mainstream. The CA was mandated by the interim Constitution to write a new constitution within two years and to operate as Nepal’s Parliament during this period. The Maoists, Nepali
Congress, CPN-UML, and MPRF obtained 229, 115, 108, and 54 seats, respectively, in the 601
member CA (240 elected in single member districts, 335 elected through a proportional representation method, and 26 nominated). The remaining 95 seats were won by 21 smaller political parties.
The CA subsequently elected Prachanda as prime minister in August 2008.
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relatives to important positions during their tenure in office, while former
Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala is attempting to establish his daughter,
Sujata Koirala, as the leader of the Nepali Congress. First, he arranged for
Sujata Koirala to lead the Nepali Congress in Madhav Kumar Nepal’s new
government, purposely sending a team of junior leaders to the Cabinet so
that she could become the leader of that contingent. Second, he pressured
the tottering Madhav Kumar Nepal to promote her as the country’s deputy
prime minister despite loud objections of many top Nepali Congress party
officials and some rank-and-file.
Delay in Writing the Constitution

Brazen partisan activities, among other things, caused a serious delay in writing a new Constitution for Nepal. The schedule had already been changed
seven times by late fall 2009. By October 2009, five thematic committees,
which had formed to deliberate and propose drafts of various segments of
the Constitution to the main body, had yet to finalize their reports, and only
six committees out of 14 had submitted their completed papers to the full
CA body.8 The Maoists continue to block the proceedings of the CA to protest the president’s move to reinstate the army chief. Thus, writing the new
Constitution is likely to be delayed further. This raises the potentially unsavory prospect that the Constitution may eventually be hurriedly written by
only a few leaders in order to meet the two-year deadline dictated by the
Interim Constitution that ends on May 28, 2010. Such an eventuality would
defeat the purpose of the CA to promote extensive deliberations within both
the institution itself and among members of society at large. The fact that
the CA was created to both write the document and also concurrently to
operate as Nepal’s Parliament has exacerbated the delay. The CA’s latter function, in particular, has taken a significant toll on the task of building consensus and drafting the Constitution.
The CA has thus far failed to resolve two major issues preventing the
timely writing of the Constitution—the nature of the executive system, i.e.,
whether it will be parliamentary or presidential, and the model of federalism
to be used. Many parties in Nepal seem to favor the presidential system, either because the parliamentary system did not perform well in the past or
8. Martin Chautari, “Policy Brief: Update on the Constituent Assembly,” Kathmandu, Martin
Chautari.org.np, October 2009.
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because they see a necessity for a strong executive. Yet, if the global experience of all non-U.S. presidential systems that faced crisis is any indication,
the adoption of a presidential system would increase the likelihood of inviting crisis in the future such as military coups or presidents turning into autocrats by concentrating power in the executive by undermining parliament
and the judiciary. The opposition would quite likely be prompted to engage
in disruptive street movements against the increasingly autocratic president,
if this were to occur.
The debate on federalism has revolved around whether to grant autonomy
to ethnic communities and, if so, how much. The rightist parties and the
dominant group such as Bahun, Chhetri, and some upper caste Newars oppose granting significant autonomy, whereas marginalized ethnic groups such
as the Tharus, Limbus, Khambus, Tamangs, and regional identity groups like
the Madhesis insist on it. For their part, the Maoists have supported the minority groups’ demands, but eventually denying ethnic marginalized groups
significant autonomy in any final compromise among the top leadership of
major political parties cannot be realistically ruled out. Ethnic autonomy is
not at the top of the Maoists’ agenda, and they might give it up in return for
other policy objectives. In addition, most of the major political parties in the
country, including the Maoists, are led by high-caste Hindu males from the
hill regions. The top CPN-UML and Nepali Congress leaders vehemently
oppose ethnic autonomy, whereas the top Bahun Maoist leaders may give in.
The denial of such autonomy, however, is likely to trigger street movements
by the indigenous nationalities and the Madhesis. This realization seems to
have dawned on political parties like CPN-UML, which has lately proposed
that some regions grant ethnic autonomies by configuring regions around
concentration of major ethnic groups.
One major issue that has not been debated seriously in the CA is governmental accountability, a major problem in Nepal’s political history including
during the democratic years of the 1990s. The culture of impunity resulting
from the excessive centralization of power and the majoritarian political culture among the political elite has contributed to this lingering problem.
Many Nepalese seem to have resigned themselves to the notion that political
leaders will do whatever they please once elected. Politicians in general may
be reluctant to develop stringent accountability mechanisms for fear that
those same mechanisms may come back to haunt them later. Unless civil
society actors in Nepal mobilize to insert strong accountability mechanisms
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in the new Constitution, the country may be plagued by gross abuses of
power and corruption well into the foreseeable future.
Security Situation

Transition periods are, by definition, precarious and potentially more lawless
because of the breakdown of the previous system and the uncertainty emanating from the one yet to be finalized. The security situation deteriorated
significantly in Nepal in 2009, especially away from the capital Kathmandu,
largely because of bickering among the major political parties. Kidnapping,
extortions, and killings have become widespread. The Youth Communist
League of the CPN-M and the Youth Force of the CPN-UML often clash,
raising questions about the commitment of the major parties toward the rule
of law. As a result, many other parties have formed, or announced plans for,
similar paramilitary forces.
Numerous armed groups, political as well as criminal, have sprouted in the
Tarai (lowlands) region bordering India. Limbuwan groups in the east have
militias, collect taxes, and “govern” their region. The indigenous Khambu,
Tamang, and Tharu groups have also paraded their own security forces to the
media. In fact, a report by the Conflict Study Center listed 74 armed and
semi-armed groups born after the peace accord of November 2006.9
In late July 2009, the Home Ministry announced the formulation of a
Special Security Plan (SSP) in order to improve the law and order situation.
Uncertainty about the government’s longevity, as well as distinguishing
among criminal and political groups, will make it hard to implement this
plan. The SSP has also been criticized by Madhesi and indigenous nationalities that say it is targeted toward their social-justice movements. If the government is not careful, ongoing ethnic and political conflicts—especially in
the Tarai Region—could be further aggravated by the insensitivity of the
administration and security forces, which comprise largely hill people.
Street Movements

The year 2009 also witnessed several major street movements by political
parties representing the indigenous peoples of Nepal. These parties received
9. Pathak, Bishnu, and Devendra Uprety, Tarai-Madhes: Searching for Identity Based Security (Kathmandu: Conflict Study Center, October 2009). The home minister is reported to have publicly said
that 109 armed groups operate in the country. See <http://nepalnews.com>, accessed July 31, 2009.
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only five seats out of 601 in the CA.10 Many indigenous parties resorted to
street protests because they could not influence the constitution-writing process in the CA. For example, the Tharuhat struggle committee launched two
series of sustained street protests in collaboration with other indigenous and
Muslim groups in February-March and April-May. Other groups such as the
Limbus called numerous bandhs (shutdowns) in the far eastern parts of the
country.
In contrast, the post-2008 election period did not witness long and sustained street mobilization by the Madhesi groups and parties—as in pre2008-election years—probably because the Madhesis have been able to influence mainstream politics through higher levels of representation from
Madhesi ethnic parties in the CA and Cabinet. The activities of the indigenous and Madhesi parties suggest that groups excluded from the system may
mobilize outside of it. For their part, the Maoists began their second phase
of protests on November 1, 2009, consisting of sit-in protests, demonstrations, and picketing of government offices. Their demand is to form a national government headed by them because they are the largest party in the
CA. In early December, the Maoists launched the third phase of their protest
movement, and declared 13 autonomous ethnic (Magarat, Kochila, Madhesh,
Tamuwan, Sherpa, etc.) and regional (Bheri-Karnali, Seti-Mahakali, etc.)
states by December 18. They also announced three-day countrywide bandh
from December 20.
B H U TA N

Bhutan’s transition to institutionalized democracy has been much smoother
than that of Nepal, largely because the process in Bhutan has been “topdown” and controlled. Yet, this does not mean the absence of political problems and violence in Bhutan. A year after the first parliamentary elections,
the media and political opposition have become more assertive, but ordinary
people still do not enjoy genuine political rights and civil liberties. The constitutional monarch, Jigme Kheshar Namgyel Wangchuk, retains considerable power, including the right to reject the decisions of the elected Parliament. Political rallies and public demonstrations are not allowed, and media
outlets have been fined for criticizing government officials. The Lhotshampa,
10. It should be noted that indigenous peoples do find a form of weak representation in the
political process through membership in many of Nepal’s major political parties.
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Bhutanese of Nepali origin, that live in the southern part of the country do
not benefit from even the minimal rights enjoyed by other citizens. Their
cultural and political rights, including citizenship and freedom of movement, are constrained by the Drukpa regime that promotes the domination
of one people and culture.11
Ethnic discrimination and restrictions on their rights have increased dissatisfaction among the Lhotshampa in southern Bhutan. More than a hundred thousand Bhutanese refugees, who were expelled or ran away to escape
prosecution after protesting the imposition of Drukpa culture (language,
dress, etc.) on the diverse inhabitants of the kingdom, have been living in refugee camps in southeastern Nepal since the early 1990s. The Maoists—formally
known as the Communist Party of Bhutan (CPB-MLM)—have begun to
exploit these grievances by increasing their political activities, including violence. Bombings committed by suspected Maoists have occasionally damaged bridges, fuel depots, and electrical installations. The recruiting ground
for the Maoists in Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal may be drying up with
the resettlement of Bhutanese refugees, largely in the U.S. but also in Australia,
Norway, Canada, New Zealand, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
In contrast, southern Bhutan will continue to remain a potent breeding
ground as long as discrimination continues. By October 2009, around
22,000 Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal had been flown out for resettlement, with many thousands more waiting their turn. Those who have refused resettlement and instead insist on repatriation may have stronger incentives to join radical organizations. Partial opening up of the polity may
facilitate organization by such groups. The Bhutan Tiger Force, United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan, and United Refugee Liberation Army have
owned up to various violent actions. Thus, while the transition to limited
democracy may appear to be smoother in Bhutan than in Nepal, it has also
been fraught with problems. The full trajectory, and effect, of the democratization process remains to be seen.

11. The Drukpa regime primarily consists of the Ngalongs, a minority community of Tibetan origin settled in western Bhutan. The Drukpa share many cultural commonalities with other ethnic/
regional groups in Bhutan such as the Khengs in the central part of the country and Sharchops in the
east. Lhotshampa, in contrast, are Nepali-speaking people who began settling in previously uninhabited southern Bhutan for agricultural cultivation in the late 19th century. At the time of their expulsion, the Lhotshampa constituted from about one-third to half of Bhutan’s total population.
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